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INTRODUCTION
This case t u r n s on the interpretation of the Metropolitan insurance
policy. State Farm h a s admitted that if this court finds no coverage under the
Metropolitan policy, it will pay the damages to which Amy Echard Otto, the
plaintiff in the underlying action, is entitled under the uninsured motorist
provisions of its policy. If the court finds coverage u n d e r the Metropolitan
policy, Metropolitan will respond to the plaintiffs claims.
W h e t h e r t h e Metropolitan policy covers t h e claim t u r n s on

an

interpretation of the insuring agreement which provides, in pertinent part:
We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage
to others for which the law holds an insured responsible
because of an occurrence which results from the ownership,
maintenance or use of a covered automobile or a non-owned
automobile.
(R. 347-348, 360.) (Appellant's Brief, Tab 2.) Coverage in this case depends on
two requirements of this insuring agreement. Thor Wixom would have to have
been a n (1) "insured" driving a (2) "non-owned automobile."

The issue of

whether he was a n "insured" was covered in the opening briefs. This Reply
Brief will concentrate on the issue of whether Thor Wixom was driving a "nonowned automobile."
Summary judgment for State Farm was improper. The record is clear
that Thor Wixom was not driving a "non-owned automobile." At best for State
Farm, the record shows t h a t genuine issues of material fact remained to be
determined, and t h a t the District Court could not have entered s u m m a r y
judgment for State Farm without improperly adjudicating these facts.
1

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT THOR WIXOM MET
POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR DRIVING A " N O N - O W N E D
AUTOMOBILE."

To find coverage under the Metropolitan policy, the trial court would
necessarily have had to made a finding that the car Thor Wixom was driving
in the accident qualified as a "non-owned automobile" as described in the
Metropolitan policy.

It was not.

To the extent prior briefing h a s not fully

developed this issue, this reply memorandum will explain why Thor Wixom did
not meet the requirements for

a "non-owned automobile" because he was

driving a car that was available for his regular use.
1. THE CAR THOR WIXOM DROVE IN THE ACCIDENT WAS SO REGULARLY
AVAILABLE THAT THIS COURT CAN DECIDE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
THE CAR WAS AVAILABLE FOR HIS REGULAR USE AND THEREFORE DID NOT
QUALIFY AS A "NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE."

The car Thor Wixom was driving in this accident cannot meet the
requirements as a non-owned automobile because it was regularly available
for his use. The facts are so clear that reasonable minds can draw no other
conclusion. Thor Wixom had parked his car at least two weeks before the
accident and there is nothing in the record to show that he drove any other
vehicle during this two-week period before the accident.

(R. 380-381, 383.)

Whenever he was in a car, this is the one he drove. The record shows no
limitations on when he had the car available to him except for the times when
its owner, his fiance, was using it. (R. 380.) At one point in the record, he
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remembered that he used the car about seven times in the two weeks before
the accident. (R. 384.)
The policy language which m u s t be met for the car Thor Wixom was
driving to be "non-owned automobile" is clear:
"non-owned automobile" m e a n s an automobile which is
neither owned by, furnished to, nor made available for
regular use to you or any resident in your household.
(R. 348, 368; Appellant's Brief, Tab 2.)

Under this policy provision, Thor

Wixom h a s no coverage if he was driving a car "made available for regular use"
by him.
State Farm argues that the test under this policy language is actual use
of the car. It is not. A more careful reading shows that the test is whether the
car is "available for regular use" of the person seeking coverage. Actual use
can prove availability because to be used, the car had to be available. The car
can also be available on other occasions whether it is actually used or not.
Contrary to the erroneous finding of fact the trial court would have
been required to reach, the car Thor Wixom was driving at the time this
accident was available for his regular use. At the time of the accident, the car
Thor Wixom was driving was garaged at the home where Thor Wixom was
living.

(R. 377.)

Although Thor Wixom owned a car of his own, he had

canceled his insurance and was not driving his car. (R. 380-81.) The record
reveals no other car being available to Thor during the two-week period before
the accident.
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The only limitation to vehicle availability in the record is t h a t the car
was not available when Thor Wixom's fiance was using it.

(R. 378.)

Even

then, Thor often drove the car when the couple was together. (R. 382.) In his
deposition, Thor Wixom recalled "maybe seven times" he h a d driven his
fiance's car in the two weeks before the accident. (R. 382.)
In short, the record reflects that the car made available to Thor Wixom
on the date of the accident was the only car he had available to him in the
two weeks before the accident.

(R. 381-83.) Nothing indicates he was ever

told he could not drive the car. (R. 381.) Thus, it was fully available for his
regular use. (R. 381-83.)

The only real limitation, according to the record, is

when his fiamce was driving the car. (R. 380.) Even then, he testified that he
sometimes drove.

(R. 384.) The availability of Thor Wixom's fiance's car was

so regular that this court can find, as a matter of law, that the car Thor Wixom
was driving at the time of the accident was available for his regular use. He
used it regularly. Even during times he was not using it, it was available for
his regular use.
2 . GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINED REGARDING WHETHER
THE CAR WAS A "NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE."

Because this is a n appeal from a grant of a motion for s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t , the existence of a factual dispute requires reversal.

Wilcox v

Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1996). This court need apply no
deference to the trial court's conclusion t h a t there were no issues of fact
precluding summary judgment. Id.
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In this case, the statements upon which State Farm relies came from a
deposition taken before Metropolitan was made a party to this action.

(R.

375.) Because Metropolitan was not a party, it had no counsel present at Thor
Wixom's deposition.

(R. 376.)

In fact, the only counsel present at Thor

Wixom's deposition were the two lawyers whose clients can benefit from
coverage u n d e r the Metropolitan policy:

State Farm's counsel Erik K.

Davenport, and underlying plaintiff Amy Echard Otto's father and counsel
Robert A. Echard. (R. 376.)
Under leading questioning, Thor Wixom at one point agreed with
counsel's testimony that his use had not been "on a regular basis." (R. 329330)

State Farm's reliance on this isolated testimony is misplaced. As

explained in the preceding subsection of this brief, availability
issue, not the frequency that the use has exercised.

for use is the

In summary, the record,

as a whole, supports Metropolitan's view t h a t it was entitled to s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t because Thor Wixom was driving a car t h a t was available for his
regular use. Because it was available for his regular use, it does not meet the
requirement for a non-owned automobile, as that term is used in the policy. If
t h e r e is any question from the record on appeal, we have a factual
determination which, at the very least, would m a n d a t e reversal of the
summary judgment granted to State Farm Insurance.
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B.

UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. THE "AVAILABLE FOR REGULAR
USE" LANGUAGE IN METROPOLITAN'S POLICY IS UNAMBIGUOUS.

State Farm cites Metropolitan
Finlayson,

Property

& Liability

Insurance

751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988), vacated on rehearing,

Co. v.

Metropolitan

Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. Finlayson, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1989),
for the proposition that because language similar to Metropolitan's "available
for regular use" language was ambiguous under one set of facts, it m u s t be
ambiguous here too. This is incorrect.

First, Finlayson

h a s been vacated.

Second, ambiguity m u s t be determined in light of the facts of the case. A
provision found to be ambiguous under one set of facts can be unambiguous
under another.
In Overson v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty,

587 P.2d 149 (Utah

1978), t h e court considered a claim t h a t an i n s u r a n c e provision w a s
ambiguous and therefore required coverage. The party seeking coverage cited
a n u m b e r of cases, all finding ambiguity in a policy provision similar to that at
issue in the case. Id. at 150.

The court ruled t h a t these cases were not

controlling because they were decided under different facts. The court found
it important t h a t "each case cited addresses close factual questions, not
present here." Id. See also, Jacobson v Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 652 P.2d 909,
911 (Utah 1982) (facts of case made ambiguity a non-issue).
This rule applies to the case before this court. A finding of ambiguity
u n d e r the facts of Finlayson

does not translate to a finding of ambiguity of

similar language under the facts of this case. Finlayson

loses any vitality it

h a d when State Farm attempts to stretch it beyond its facts. As was more
€

fully briefed in Metropolitan's initial brief, u n d e r either of the claimed
definitions of regular use availability discussed in Finlayson,

there would be

no coverage under the facts of Thor Wixom's use of his fiance's car. Under the
facts of Thor Wixom's case, the policy is unambiguous.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no coverage u n d e r the Metropolitan policy
without a showing that Thor Wixom comes within the insuring agreement of
t h a t policy.

That insuring agreement requires that: 1) Thor Wixom be an

insured; and 2) t h a t he be driving a vehicle which qualifies as a non-owned
automobile.

The car Thor Wixom was driving cannot be a non-owned

automobile because it was available for Thor Wixom's regular use.

Because

reasonable minds could not differ on this, this court should be able to find
t h a t there was no coverage under Metropolitan's policy. If there is a factual
dispute, it will at very least m a n d a t e reversal of the s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
granted to State Farm Insurance.
/;

DATED this 10th day of J u n e , 1998.
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